Why We Have Good Reason to Trust Our Moral Intuition
Philosophers have long debated the epistemic status of moral intuition. I reorient the debate to the pragmatic implications of trusting this intuition.
I begin by defending three propositions.
(1) Normative statements, comprising moral intuitions/beliefs and normative statements about reasons, are truth-apt claims.
(2) An individual trusting their moral intuition means that they believe most of their moral intuitions.
(3) All normative, including epistemic, reasons for (dis)trust are fictitious; good reasons for action and belief describe desires and effective means of satisfying them.
I then formulate a reasons principle for collective desires. I use it to contend that our desires are more satisfied if we trust our moral intuition, responding to the essay question with “yes.”
Normative Statements
Cognitivists posit that normative statements are truth-apt claims,1 while non-cognitivists 2 generally posit that they are non-truth-apt attitudes/commands.3
A problem with non-cognitivism is that it does not permit logical arguments using normative statements.4
Consider:
- If stealing is bad, getting someone to steal is bad.
- Stealing is bad.
- Getting someone to steal is bad.
For non-cognitivists, “stealing is bad” is an attitude/command. But, “stealing is bad,” as it is used in the first sentence, is not an attitude/command, but a hypothetical moral claim. Therefore, the third sentence does not follow from the first and second because they falsely equivocate “stealing is bad.” Logically, though, the third sentence does follow from the first and second. Non-cognitivist replies seem to fail upon scrutiny.5
Trusting Intuition
Perhaps intuition is belief.6 In Fig. 1, squares A and B seem to be different colours. Upon inspection, they are the same colour. Though I believe that squares A and B are the same colour, I intuit otherwise; therefore, intuition is not belief.
Fig.17
Perhaps intuition is a disposition to belief, something that nudges the mind so that belief in something is easier.8 Say I have a disposition to believe in false things, such as witchcraft; but, I am unaware of the concept of witchcraft. My disposition to believe in witchcraft, according to the aforementioned definition, is an intuition. Yet, I cannot intuit something I am unaware of. Therefore, intuition is not a disposition to belief.
A scientifically backed and, so, more plausible, account of intuition is psychologists’ dual-system model. System I is responsible for fast/automatic thought (e.g., intuitions). System II is responsible for slow/deliberate thought (e.g., beliefs). System I “generates suggestions” for System II, which deliberates about them, and then adopts/rejects them.9
I trust my moral intuition only if my System II mostly10 adopts my System I moral intuitions—that is, trust in my moral intuition means belief in most of my moral intuitions.11
Good Reasons
Perhaps some “reason” for me to trust my moral intuition normatively counts in favour of me trusting it.12 If so, categorical reasons arise regardless of desires. If my moral intuitions are mostly true, an epistemic reason to trust my moral intuition arises. If trusting my moral intuition leads to a morally desirable result, an imperative reason to do so arises. Alternatively, if trusting this intuition satisfies my desires, a hypothetical reason to do so arises. This begs the question: how may these normative claims about reasons and morals be true? Under relativism, they are true only if my culture deems them true. Under subjectivism, they are true only if I deem them true. Under objectivism, they are true only if they are objectively true.
Relativism and subjectivism are false because they permit logical contradictions, if not rendering normative disagreement impossible.13 Say a subject 14 claims some action is bad whilst another claims it is good. Relativism and subjectivism may imply that these contradicting claims are both true. In response, relativists and subjectivists clarify that the subjects’ claims pertain merely to them, rendering normative disagreement impossible; the truth of such claims depends on whether the subject (dis)approves of acts instead of whether the acts are good. Yet, there is disagreement15 about whether acts are good—for instance, in normative ethics.16
Meanwhile, as Streumer argues, objectivism is false because normative properties are fictitious.17
Streumer starts by defining predicates as parts of sentences that ascribe properties to objects. In the sentence “the circle is round,” “is round” is a descriptive predicate. In the sentence “torture is good,” “is good” is a normative predicate.
Then:
(R1) Predicates ascribe the same property only if they necessarily coincide.
Some submit alleged counter-instances.18 The predicates “is the only even prime number” and “is the square root of 4” necessarily coincide but may ascribe different properties; yet, both ascribe the integer 2. The only way for this counter-instance to succeed is for properties to be procedures that yield the identity of an object rather than a way an object is, yet that is not the case.
(R2-a) If normative properties exist, objects ascribed with normative predicates are necessarily ascribed with descriptive predicates.
(R2-b) If normative properties exist for possible realities A and B, and if the instantiation of descriptive predicates is the same in A as in B, the instantiation of normative predicates is the same in A as in B.
(R2) If normative properties exist, normative predicates and descriptive predicates necessarily coincide.
(R2-a) is true because something can only be good/bad because it ascribes certain descriptive predicates, such as causes suffering and is an instance of theft. (R2-b) is also true; if another reality is identical to ours, surely objects that are bad in ours are also bad in it. By deduction, (R2) is true.
(R3) If normative properties exist, normative predicates and descriptive predicates ascribe the same property.
(R4) Normative predicates and descriptive predicates do not ascribe the same property.
If (R4) is false, utmostly intelligent and knowledgeable beings (UUB) shall, after utmost reflection, be guaranteed to agree on which objects certain normative predicates ascribe. But, say some UUB, after utmost reflection, concludes that suffering is good. Is this judgement “guaranteed to be true?”19 Surely not. Some reply that this UUB’s conclusion is faulty because its reflection is irrational. But, on this view, a statement such as “pleasure is good” is right only if a UUB, after utmost, rational reflection, judges it so. Since is rational is a normative predicate, the preceding statement is right only if a UUB, after utmost, rational reflection, judges it so. And so on, to infinite regress; this view is false and (R4) is true.
(R5) Normative properties are fictitious.
(R6) Therefore, normative claims are objectively false.20
Since relativism and subjectivism are false, and (R6) is true, normative claims are false. Therefore, moral intuitions are false, along with epistemic, imperative, and/or hypothetical claims about reasons to (dis)trust moral intuition.21
According to Olson, however, “good” and “reason” also have a descriptive sense.22 In the sentence “Stalin had a good reason to purge his opponents,” “good reason” is clearly not normative. Instead, “good reason” merely means that Stalin desired power, and purging his opponents was an effective means to that end. If trusting my moral intuition satisfies my desires, a reason to do so arises. Then, for each of my n desires23 my trusting my moral intuition satisfies to any point,24 let:
f(n) = (intensity of the nth desire) [(satisfaction of the nth desire from trusting my moral intuition) - (satisfaction of the nth desire from distrusting my moral intuition)]25
and
The larger 𝛄, the better the reason.
Collective Reasons
We have a reason to trust our moral intuition only if doing so satisfies our desires. Yet, desires vary across individuals, and are, metaphysically, products of a singular condition. In response, I present the Collective Reasons Principle (CGP), drawing from Rawls’ original position.26
Consider an unborn individual, Omega, who shall be born into some random position.27 Omega is a conscious being that is aware of its impending birth, yet has no physical body,28 no memories of its own,29 and is indifferent to its current condition. Omega has experienced, from the first-person, the complete-life of all positions’ desires, and satisfaction thereof, it can possibly be born into. If Omega desires to be born into a population that comprises individuals who trust their moral intuition, we have a reason to do so; let the CGP be approving.
The GGP is Approving
(A1) We must trust our moral intuition for us to consistently act on most of our moral intuitions.
If we act on our moral intuitions while disbelieving them—that is, doubting them or believing them to be false—it is only because we are acting on some other desire(s). Since this alignment is mere coincidence, and many times our selfish desires misalign with our moral intuitions, consistent action on most of our moral intuitions is impossible. Alternatively, our moral intuitions may be so strong that we act on them though we disbelieve them. This may occasionally occur when we are not lucid or under acute stress; but, mostly, we cannot consistently act on most of our moral intuitions if we disbelieve them.
Say we believe that individuals ought to x. Externalists argue that our belief is not enough for us to desire to x, needing also a separate desire to x. Internalists argue our belief is enough for us to desire to x. In either case, we may act on most of our moral intuitions only if we believe them. Since our significant acts are mostly behaviours supported by our beliefs, and most moral intuitions entail significant acts, (A1) is true.
(A2) The CGP is approving only if we consistently act on most of our moral intuitions.
Most of our moral intuitions were tuned by natural selection to maximise the probability of our group’s survival and prosperity. Such intuitions include reciprocity, cooperation, etc.30 So, consistently acting on most of our moral intuitions generally satisfies many of our intense desires. But, say we do not. Such a scenario is one in which most people's desires are not satisfied. With scarce resources, billions of people must compete to use those resources. As the prisoner’s dilemma asserts, the individual is ultimately selfish, leading them to harm others to gain more resources as cooperation does not align with their self-interest. In the long term, such actions decrease the satisfaction of desires because cooperation leads to greater rewards.
Two cases follow.
First, the strongest violently subjugate others for resources.31 Combined with our intelligence, the strongest use technology to subjugate the masses on an immense scale. Since we do not consistently act on most of our moral intuitions, the strongest cannot “brainwash” their subjects by appealing to/fostering moral intuitions in their subjects to favour their power. Universally, they must run solely violent autocracies. As such, most people’s desires are unsatisfied.
Second, each individual is endlessly pitted against others. Hobbes coins this scenario “a war of all against all,” where individuals live a “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” life.32 As such, most people’s desires are unsatisfied.
If we consistently act on most of our moral intuitions, people are not in a state of violent subjugation or complete war to the same degree as the alternative. Surely, then, Omega desires to be born into a population that consistently acts on most of their moral intuitions. So, the CGP is approving. Some object: Considering oppression/war/violence33 that do not satisfy many individuals’ desires and yet are approved of by some individuals’ moral intuitions, how is the CGP approving? But, this objection is misguided: In the alternative scenarios of war and/or violent subjugation, more people’s desires are left unsatisfied.
(A3) Therefore, the CGP is approving only if we trust our moral intuition.
So, we have a reason to trust our moral intuition. Comparing a reality where we trust our moral intuition to one where we do not, 𝛄 is large enough for that reason to be good.34 Therefore, we have a good reason to trust our moral intuition. □
Bibliography
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth, and Logic. Penguin Classics, 2001.
Geach, P. (1964): “Assertion”, Philosophical Review, 74, pp. 449-465
Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press, 1972.
Hobbes, Thomas, and John Plamenatz. Leviathan. Fontana Press, 1962.
Inwagen, Peter. “Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11, 1997, pp. 305–19.
JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216135. Accessed 4 July 2024.
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin UK, 2011.
Lewis, David. 1983, Philosophical Papers: Volume I, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
Olson, Jonas. Moral Error Theory. Oxford UP, 2014.
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford UP, 1987.
Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Academic, 2013.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. Belknap Press, 1999.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? Oxford UP, USA, 2004.
Streumer, Bart. Unbelievable Errors. Oxford UP, 2017.
Tomasello, Michael. A Natural History of Human Morality. Harvard UP, 2016.
Endnotes
1. For instance, subject] ought (not) [do x] and [subject] has reason to [do x] and [doing x] is good/bad.
2. Ayer (1936) and Hare (1972).
3. For instance, boo/yay [doing x] and do [x].
4. Geach (1964).
5. Blackburn’s logic of norms, along with quasi-realism and other forms of expressivism, have all faced serious scrutiny. But, that is outside the scope of this essay. To pursue further reading, reference https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/embedding-problem-responses.html
6. Lewis (1983).
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Checker_shadow_illusion#/media/File:Checker_shadow_illusion.svg
8. Inwagen (1997).
9. Kahneman (2011).
10. Similarly, one does not have to trust every weather prediction to claim they trust weather predictions—most shall do.
11. This claim fits an account that trusting moral intuitions means “cognitive reliance” on them (Bengson et al. 2019). But, the rest of that paper falls into an epistemic discussion of moral intuition—one I seek to avoid.
12. Parfit (2011).
13. Shafer-Landau (2003).
14. Specifically, a person/ culture.
15. Importantly, first-order disagreement.
16. This objection is also effective against quietist claims that moral claims, though cognitivist, do not ascribe moral properties to objects. If that is so, disagreement about the moral properties of acts is impossible; but, it is possible. So, quietism is false.
17. Streumer (2017).
18. Olson (2014) and Parfit (2011).
19. Streumer (2017).
20. Some object to this error theory. It seems that given the claims “murder is bad” and “murder is permissible”, this theory makes them “murder is not bad” and “murder is not permissible,” respectively. But, this seems to be contradictory. Olson (2014) answers these objections; in part, he argues that the error theory renders claims false on the second-order, still allowing for first-order moral disagreement (reference endnote 15).
21. For instance, some might claim we have epistemic reasons to distrust such intuitions due to their (1) unreliability across time and peoples and/or (2) that intuitions do not align with moral truth because they arose through the morally neutral evolutionary process and/or (3) morally irrelevant factors affect our moral intuitions. But, these and any epistemic reasons to trust such intuitions are false by (R6).
22. Olson (2014).
23. By desires, I mean present and future desires. Though some views on personal identity claim that future desires are irrelevant to reasons, I, and (Parfit 1984), claim that one will experience future desires with the same force as present desires—the matter of when is irrelevant on account of experience.
24. By any point, I include negative satisfaction—or dissatisfaction.
25. If the difference in the satisfaction of some desire by doing something is greater, it is the case that I have a better reason to satisfy it. Consider a situation where I eat lots of fries. Say that I desire health. Say also that I am considering eating fewer fries. If I continue eating lots of fries, I shall be unhealthy. If I eat less, I shall be more healthy. The difference in the satisfaction of my desire for health between these two cases is considerable. Say also that I consume lead. If I continue unabated, I shall die. If I quit, I shall live. By contrast, the difference in the satisfaction of my desire for health in these two cases is immense. So, I have a better reason to quit consuming lead than to eat less fries.
26. Rawls (1971).
27. By position, I reference Rawls’ use of the term to mean a unique individual life, throughout human existence (Rawls 1971).
28. Other than a brain, of course.
29. Though it has a perfect memory.
30. Tomassello (2016).
31. Tomassello (2016); chimpanzees, our closest relatives, lack moral intuitions, and organise their societies in this way. Since chimpanzees are also a good approximation of our distant ancestors, their societies are a reasonable alternative.
32. Hobbes (1651).
33. For instance, slavery, the Holocaust, and apartheid, among other things.
34. Recall, the larger 𝛄, the better the reason.