Defending Arms Dealers: Why profiting from Harm can be defended
Is it ever just to profit from doing harm when the harm would have happened regardless? At its most basic level, the true ethical kickback from any single action cannot be measured or even estimated. If damage is inevitable, then profiting from that harm can be ethically justified, particularly when the profit does not perpetuate further suffering and may even contribute to the collective good.
First, I need to target the first few words of the question: “Is it ever just?” I begin here because ethical standards are inherently subjective and have varied widely across time and cultures. The “Code of Ur-Nammu”, the first recorded evidence of laws, was written around 2100–2050 BCE. Although physically nothing more than carvings on stone, the ancient Sumerian stone has given architects and historians the oldest evidence of any measurement of morality. The stone contains 32 surviving laws, many of which include the now-frowned-upon death sentence as a fit punishment for murders and robberies.
While the “Code of Ur-Nammu”, named after the ancient Sumerian ruler of the same name, references slavery, torture, and forced marriages, the most evident proof of the evolution of ethics and morality is shown in the third recovered law. The third law, roughly translated, states: If a man commits a kidnapping, he must be imprisoned and pay 15 shekels of silver.
While at the time, this punishment was deemed fitting for the crime, comparing it to the death sentence given to any man who commits a robbery highlights a striking inconsistency. This is because, in modern societies, kidnapping, especially in extreme cases, is deemed a far less forgivable crime than the robbery of material possessions. Although laws and societal norms have evolved over the past 4000 years, ancient Sumeria’s harsher punishment for theft than for kidnapping highlights that the current “moral good” is just a blip in human history, as laws and societies have evolved and will continue to evolve throughout generations.
This essay is trying to answer the question: Is it ever just to profit from doing harm when the harm would have happened regardless? I introduced the idea when talking about the laws of Sumeria that nothing can always be unjust, and nothing can always be just.
As for the question, “Is it ever just to profit from doing harm when the harm would have happened regardless?” Profiting from inevitable harm can be ethically justified if no act is inherently unjust. If moral nihilism alone doesn’t adequately justify this view, Rawls’s philosophy may offer further support. Famous economist and philosopher John Rawls invites thinkers to look at being born as a lottery, where a future life has to choose whether or not to enter a world in which 52% of the population lives on less than ten dollars a day. The point of this thought experiment is to get people to understand that if you didn’t know where you would be born, most people wouldn’t take the risk.
John Rawls also believed that while utilitarianism is a flawed ideal, it is the responsibility of every human being to make the world a better place for the collective good. This detour brings us back to the original question: Is it ever just to profit from doing harm when the harm would have happened regardless? The question never states that the profit from the harm would lead to more damage, meaning the profit itself (though it comes from flawed sources) is, in and of itself, not immoral. Because harm would happen regardless of profit, the only real difference is where that profit goes.
In 1928, Hungarian physicist and mathematician Neumann János published the first paper referencing Game Theory, which stated that many decisions can be calculated to have an ideal outcome. Neumann Janos used this theory in action during the Cold War when he said that the best decision would be to launch nuclear bombs before the Soviet Union could do so to ensure the Americans' survival. He said this because breaking down this highly complex political situation into a win-lose equation makes it easier to rationalize harsh decisions such as launching nuclear bombs. This relates to my thesis because breaking down the complex idea into two outcomes: harm being done/harm being done with you profiting off of it, shows a straightforward solution to the problem. This is because you can reinvest the profits into better causes, altering the equation into: harm being done with the profits going into good causes or harm happening regardless of where the profit goes.
Hypothetically, if a war started between two nations, should a government forbid a sanctioned arms dealer from profiting off the war, even if it is known that the two nations would continue fighting with outdated weapons that could malfunction? And while no additional casualties come from a third party profiting from death, the profit could be used to help end the war or go toward charitable causes. In a situation where the profit from this war leads to the war ending earlier, profiting from the war would actually result in fewer deaths.
While unlikely, this exact situation does occur; the question asks if “it is ever just,” not if “it is always just.” Meaning, if profiting off of harm, when harm would have taken place regardless, can be justified, then it is possible to answer this question confidently with a yes. To restate the previous point, I ask: How does profiting from suffering lead to suffering if the only thing affected by the profit is what you choose to do with the money?
Another thing to remember is that causing a smaller harm to prevent a more extreme damage is, in the public eye, usually seen as fair or just. For example, cutting down rows of thousand-year-old, old-growth cedars causes irreparable harm to the forest and the study of biology. Still, if a raging forest fire can only be stopped by cutting down the trees that would act as a catalyst to grow the fire, then it would be just to profit off doing so. Even though this situation is different from the earlier example, it still fits the question. The fire destroyed the trees anyway, and the firefighters wouldn’t have a job if the fire didn’t exist. It is important to remember that “harm” can be done not only to humans but also to animals, plants, and wildlife. It is essential to consider this because considering trees as something that can be harmed opens this ethical question to more hypothetical situations.
In conclusion, morality can never be objective. If damage is inevitable, profiting from that harm can be ethically justified, particularly when the profit does not perpetuate further suffering and may even contribute to the collective good. Because of that, the answer to the question “Is it ever just to profit from doing harm when the harm would have happened regardless?” is, under the right circumstances in a morally complex world, justice sometimes lies not in avoiding all harm, but in how we respond to the harm we cannot prevent.